and international history" (Greene 7). They exemplify the new transnational history trend as well as ongoing efforts, in the case of Greene and Chomsky, to execute transnational labor histories. 3 An able U.S. labor historian, Greene has made a successful transition to become an accomplished scholar of a key episode in Central American and Caribbean history. With Fordlandia, Grandin, a specialist in twentieth-century Guatemalan history, makes his second U.S. incursion in a book that accompanies his U.S. actors as they touch down within Brazil. The third historian, Chomsky, specializes in Central American and Caribbean history, but her book opens with three episodes in the history of labor and immigration in her home state of Massachusetts before moving to contemporary Colombian cases and their relationships with Massachusetts, whether based on economics, immigration, or labor solidarity work.
These authors are inspired by the critical insights of Karl Marx and William Appleman Williams. 4 Chomsky does diverge stylistically, however, as she hammers home her book's bottom line: "The story that this book tells us is . . . simple, linear, and repetitive. Capital seeks inequality, because inequality allows capital to profit from low wages," thus producing "an endless race to the bottom" on both sides of the North-South divide (294). 5 Far more circumspect, Greene and Grandin successfully reach a mass nonacademic audience through accessible prose and good storytelling while eschewing political lessons directly aimed at the reader. In Chomsky's book, narrative takes second place to the fierce urgency, activist energy, and bracing anger with which she crafts hard-hitting vignettes that establish surprising connections between working people and capital in two very different countries.
One of Greene's stated aims is to explore how "diverse visions, expectations, hopes, dreams, and realities clashed" in this decisive period of the U.S. emergence as a global power (12). It was a triumph that "articulated American expansionism as a positive, humane, and beneficial activity. . . . Emerging as the apparent antithesis of empire, the Panama Canal ironically helped make American empire possible" (9). In domestic U.S. politics, it was hailed by progressive reformers and even socialists as an efficient government-run enterprise, what one reformer called a "rocky ledge in the sea of American laissez faire." 6 And in the long run, its genius was that the canal "seemed unconnected to imperialism; instead, it was seen as a display of America's domestic strengths in a world setting" and an exemplification of U.S. progressivism: "efficient, orderly, and just" (9, 206).
The global U.S. self-image that crystallized after 1898 drew upon peculiarities of the nation's ideological and religious inheritance. "The capitalists who invested in New England's early industries," Chomsky observes, "brought to their operations a curious ideological heritage" that included "a strong dose of utopian engineering," practical Christianity, and a "paternalist view of social betterment and urban uplift" (18-20, 83-5). 7 In the early twentieth century, U.S. citizens gained a new icon in Henry Ford, who "represented the vigor, dynamism, and the rushing energy that defined American capitalism" in that era (Grandin 4). It is in this sense that Grandin describes Fordlandia as a "quintessentially American story" marked, from its inception, by a "frustrated idealism" (9). At the outset, the motives for Ford's Amazonian venture might have been economic, but Grandin argues that it quickly "became more and more a museum piece, Ford's vision of Americanism frozen in amber" (262). 8 While neither plantation produced even a pound of commercialized rubber during twenty years of Ford ownership, Grandin suggests that these well-ordered U.S.-style towns deep in the Amazon could be seen as "shining examples of the American [U.S.] dream" (346). Although Henry Ford never made his promised visit, the story of "Ford men lost in the wilderness" serves as the basis for his extended meditation on "Americanness." Grandin finds "something more Mark Twain than Joseph Conrad's [Heart of Darkness], more Huckleberry [Finn] than homicidal" (202). Rather than an enterprise marked by the "mortal racism that gripped [Conrad's] Kurtz," he sees something quintessentially "American" about their "blithe insistence that all the world is more or less like us, or at least an imagined version of 'us' " (204).
Structured as a rise-and-fall narrative, Grandin's account does not neglect Ford's anti-Semitism, the ferocity of his company's opposition to labor, or his personal pacifism. For his narrative, he chooses to highlight Ford's critique of contemporary U.S. society as well as the positive dimension of Fordism: "the early twentieth-century promise of humane development" through industrialization (256). By unleashing unfettered capitalism, he suggests, Ford undermined not only the "heartland Americanism" he sought to defend but in the long run helped produce the "waste, slavery and ruination" that Grandin sees in the Amazon today (372). As a story about "U.S.," Fordlandia works splendidly and provides readers with much food for thought 9 while inviting energetic young scholars, likely Brazilian, to offer a deeper rendering from within the Amazon looking out. 10 Ford's problems with Brazilians, including the 1930 riot, stemmed in part from the rigidity of his dedication to efficiency (regimentation), hygiene (cleanliness, order, and diet), and upright living (including gardening). Disdaining politicians (graft) and government (inimical to private-sector leadership), his moralistic efforts to eliminate vice and debauchery included attempts to ban alcohol sales and the brothels that sprang up nearby. In this regard, the Panama Canal's chief engineer George Goethals was eminently more sensible than the innovative industrialist. While the Panama Canal operated within the same discursive structures, those charged with managing the vast construction project and its ever-shifting workforce were far more practical precisely because of the overwhelming urgency of completing the task (unlike the Fordlandia venture). As Greene notes, alcohol was in Goethals's judgment less a disturbance than "a source of contentment" if safely delivered and properly managed (288). As she rightly observes, Goethals and his colleagues had to constantly "adapt their ideas about government to the needs, desires, and demands of a diverse population . . . [while balancing] the symbolism of the canal versus the gritty reality of social relationships on the ground, and the design of officials versus the demands of those they sought to govern" (368).
In brilliant chapters of real analytical depth, Greene explores the lives of canal builders on and off the job. She also tackles the kaleidoscopic terrain of ethnic, racial, linguistic, and national diversity in both its gendered dimensions. While Grandin notes in passing that "Ford managers, like European colonialists in Asia and Africa, were fixated on race" (Grandin 203), Anglo-Saxonism, white supremacy and ethno-racial dynamics play a minor role in his story. Beyond prejudice against Indians and routine use of racially derogatory terms, the most explicit discussion involves a Ford official ascribing racist motives to the Brazilian workers who objected to hiring "foreign Negroes" from the West Indies (202, 162). It would have been impossible in the Panamanian case, however, to downplay these issues because the entire labor force was structured on the basis of race, nationality, and citizenship into "Gold" and "Silver" rolls, with distinct pay and benefit scales (the system was only abolished in 1955).
While the Gold/Silver system has long been known in Latin American and Central American scholarship, Greene offers the most extensive and penetrating analysis of its multiple hierarchies, shifts across time, and inherent contradictions. Since the privileged Gold workers were never explicitly defined by race, a few dozen skilled Afro-North Americans made it into the Gold rolls and fought against discrimination (a sensitive point for Republicans in Washington). They were eventually shifted to a "special" privileged position on the Silver rolls, which included foreign whites of various origins, as well as the African-descended West Indian majority (99-107). In her exploration of the skilled U.S. Gold workers, Greene charts their frustrated attempts at unionization before they realized the power of congressional lobbying. Their potential for political success led to a two-sided response: a 1908 executive order that purged aliens from the Gold rolls and a systematic ICC policy of shifting certain jobs to the Silver roll to reduce costs (92-95).
Making excellent use of rich archival material hitherto underexploited, Greene's vivid storytelling brings us the actual individuals as they voiced demands, claimed and contested their status, and made and remade their identities. As in her chapter on the Zone's female population, she captures the social distance and conflict as well as the asymmetrical interdependence that both connected and divided these varied populations. The Canal Builders also vastly expands our understanding of the predominantly "West Indian" labor force, itself a homogenizing fiction, she suggests, given inter-island differentiation and even linguistic differences (five thousand, five hundred French-speaking Martinicans). While white U.S. engineers, doctors, and steam shovel operators were lionized, it was the predominantly nonwhite West Indians who were, in the words of a descendant in 1999, the true VIPs of the canal-building process: the "Very Invisible Peoples" (382).
One of the most revealing chapters, a true gem, discusses the ICC's early decision to recruit Spaniards, largely from the new U.S. protectorate in Cuba, for a "whiteness" they imagined would make them a more desirable Silver workforce. Goethals and his fellow managers were soon disabused of their illusions because of strikes and disturbances, at times led by anarchists, that led them to negative conclusions about the "excitable nature" of these European workers. Their militancy would lead the ICC to a new appreciation of West Indians because they rarely struck and their "protests were fleeting and highly subterranean" (172, 154-5). As Greene explains convincingly, the greater aggressiveness of the Spaniards stemmed in part from the ambiguities of their legal and racial status (160, 163, 165). Whether in Fordlandia or the Canal Zone, the mess hall was particularly fraught with the potential for conflict between hungry workers and those responsible for providing decent food in a timely fashion. The 1930 Fordlandia incident arose from a management decision to implement a cafeteria-style system they believed was more efficient than table service. Amid delays caused by the recording of workers' badge numbers, an exchange between a mason and a Ford official apparently provided the spark that led to smashing dishes, trashing the mess hall, and generalized vandalism against company property (Grandin 228). A mess hall for Spanish workers in the Canal Zone was also the site of tumult in March 1907 when managers began requiring assigned seating. Charged with enforcing the new rules, a West Indian steward told a Spanish worker to move to his assigned seat. After the man responded by punching the steward, the generalized rejection of the new dispensation included a Spanish worker jumping up on a table where he reportedly shouted, "Kill the negroes!"
While avoiding the assumption that the man on the table speaks for all Spaniards, the cry of "Kill the negroes!" points to the unique role that phenotype can play in homogenizing diversity within the powerful discursive structures of the New World's racial hierarchy; after all, there were individuals with African-descended phenotypes among all of the New World citizens or imperial subjects working on the canal. It was clearly safer to vent against the weak and racially stigmatized than to yell "Kill the Americans!" U.S. citizens were untouchable while on the U.S.-controlled Canal Zone, but even when they entered Panamanian jurisdiction, as a Panamanian newspaper explained, they resisted being "arrested or interfered with in any way by a negro policeman; and the police of Panama are largely negro or mestizo. A large majority of the Americans feel themselves very superior to any Panamanian. This is inherent in their race, in any race of conquerors" (Greene 328). 11
Not all U.S. or European citizens swaggered like conquerors in early twentieth-century Panama, as Greene shows, but their mentality, rhetoric, and behavior necessarily reflected that era of gunboat diplomacy. In 1903, the United States had wrested a province from Colombia to create a new nation divided down the middle by U.S.-held territory. The Cocoa Grove incident allows us to understand the crude imperial micropolitics of drunken carousing, while the aggressive police behavior, directed against U.S. citizens this time, in part reflected their affiliation with a Conservative Party that, after being favored by the United States, was disappointed when its foreign counterparts allowed the election of a Liberal president. Whatever these Panamanian complexities, however, physical confrontations with arrogant U.S. "bastards" would inevitably be recorded as the action of unreasoning and vengeful foreign mobs. The nineteenth century had seen a relentless drive by powerful nations to secure extraterritorial immunity based on a double standard shaped by racism and a chauvinist disdain in dealing with weaker non-European peoples. 12 Panama, highly dependent and internally divided, would in the end pay compensation to the Cocoa Grove "victims" while their policemen were humiliated in 1915 by being forced to give up their rifles (Greene 330-31). But change is the only constant, and the United States was forced to give up jurisdiction over the canal in 1979. Twenty years later, it had to turn over its fourteen military bases to Panama because of anger at the 1989 U.S. invasion that left five hundred Panamanians dead. The early-twentieth-century policemen who had confronted drunken U.S. "bastards" would have smiled if they were there: Panamanians were no longer such VIPs (Very Invisible Peoples). It was precisely Latin American weakness that generated the exaggerated rhetoric about a foreign minority surrounded by looming threats and hostility at the hands of unreasoning and vengeful xenophobes. Serving as leverage against host countries, the records attesting to such fears should never, given the balance of power, be taken as proof of the existence of a real as opposed to hypothetical threat.
